UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy
Law
Volume 3
Issue 1 Computer/Law Journal - 1981

Article 12

1981

Negotiating Major System Procurements, 3 Computer L.J. 385
(1981)
Duncan M. Davidson

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science
and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Duncan M. Davidson, Negotiating Major System Procurements, 3 Computer L.J. 385 (1981)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl/vol3/iss1/12
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law by an authorized administrator
of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

NEGOTIATING MAJOR SYSTEM
PROCUREMENTSt
by DUNCAN M. DAVIDSON*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ............................................
RECOMMENDED APPROACH ............................
A.

NEGOTIATION .............................................

388

B.

PROCUREMENT PROVISIONS ..............................
1. Functional Specifications ...........................
2. Project Timetable
............................
3. Acceptance Testing ..................................

388

MAINTENANCE PROVISIONS ..............................

392

C.

III.

Page
386
388

388
390
391

1. Long-Term Maintenance Commitment ..............
2. Up-Time Commitment ...............................
3. Replacement of "Lemons" ..........................
D. SOFTWARE PROVISIONS ..................................
1. Software Support ....................................
2. Source Code .........................................
3. Indemnity ............................................
BASIC LEGAL ISSUES ....................................
A. APPLICABILITY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ....
1. Softw are .............................................
2. Leases ................................................
3. Statute of Limitations ...............................

395
396
397
399
400
400
401
404

B.

STANDARD VENDOR CONTRACT CLAUSES ................

406

1. Integration ...........................................
2. Disclaimerof Warranties............................
3. Limitations of Liability .............................

406
409
415

ACCEPTANCE .............................................

420

C.

1. Acceptance Tests .....................................
2. U.C.C. Provisions ....................................
IV. CONCLUSION ...............................................

393
393
394

395

420
421
426

t 0 1981 Duncan M. Davidson.
* Sc. B. 1975, Brown University; J.D. 1978, University of Michigan. Mr. Davidson
is associated with the law firm of Irell & Manella in Los Angeles, California.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL
I.

[Vol. IHI

INTRODUCTION

While caveat emptor may be a discredited doctrine in some
marketplaces, many computer users are beginning to become aware
of the high magnitude of risk involved in purchasing or leasing a
computer system. Computer systems are used with such critical
business procedures and operations that damages well in excess of
the cost of the system can result from malfunctions, and the failure
of a computer system to operate properly may severely impair or
even destroy the user's business. The recent case of Triangle Underwriters,Inc. v. Honeywell Inc.1 graphically illustrates the unfortunate fact that in such circumstances contractual remedies
available to the user may be limited or nonexistent, and tort remedies may be unavailable or difficult to obtain.
In 1970, when Triangle decided to convert its use of an IBM computer system to a Honeywell system, it was a well-established company which had been in business for forty years. 2 The Honeywell
system was installed in January, 1971; three years later Triangle
went out of business, and ten years later it still had not recovered
any damages. 3 Although the Honeywell system malfunctioned from
the first day it was brought on line, the court found that Triangle
was barred from any contractual remedies and, notwithstanding a
jury verdict in excess of $1.1 million for fraud, the trial judge reto $35,000. 4 This reduction was affirmed by the apduced the award
5
pellate court.
Computer users are beginning to assert themselves. An NCR
user received over fifty replies to a "blind" advertisement in Computerworld soliciting comments from other disgruntled NCR users,
6
and recently won a $2.3 million fraud verdict against NCR. Simi1. 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'g in par, rev'g in part, 457 F. Supp. 765
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
2. Scannell, Damages Slashed in Honeywell Fraud Suit, Computerworld, Dec.
15, 1980, at 1, col. 4; Bigelow & Salzberg, Computer L Newsletter, Dec. 1980, at 1.
3. 604 F.2d at 739, 740. See A Burst of CriticalFeedback, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 2, 1981,
at 68.
4. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 75 C. 1333 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26,
1980) (unpub. mem. & order), aff'd, 651 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1981). See Scannell, Honeywell Guilty of Fraud,Jury Finds, Computerworld, Sept. 15, 1980 at 1, col. 1; Scannell,
supra note 2, at 1. The jury awarded $35,000 for out-of-pocket losses, $54,000 to cover
the costs of experts engaged by Triangle to attempt to correct the problems with the
computer, and $1,000,000 for loss of business.
5. 651 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1981).
6. Laberis, User Wins $2.3 Millionfrom NCR, Computerworld, Apr. 6, 1981, at 1,
col. 1.
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larly, a user of Burroughs equipment, seeking evidence for his case,
advertised in the Wall Street Journal for other Burroughs users experiencing difficulty with their systems. Perhaps some actions are a
result of these advertisements. Over one hundred lawsuits are
pending against Burroughs. 7 Although there are only about fifteen
lawsuits pending against other major vendors in major metropolitan
areas, 8 these lawsuits are probably just the tip of the iceberg.9
This unfortunate situation has developed for two reasons. First,
many standard form contracts drafted by vendors and lessors 10 of
computer hardware and software" are one-sided in nature. Second,
computer users often enter into complicated procurement contracts
with only the barest consideration of the risk which they are
undertaking.
This article will suggest an approach to negotiation which will
7. Scannell, Burroughs Told to Release Data-Again, Computerworld, March 30,
1981, at 1, col. 4.
8. Davis, Burroughs is Top Target of User Lawsuits, MIS Week, March 25, 1981,
at 1, col. 1.
9. An expert witness recently testified that over 40% of computer installations
fail. Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 479 F. Supp. 738, 748 (D.N.J.
1979), aff'd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
10. Throughout this article, the term "vendor" will be used to designate the party
providing computer products of services, regardless of the form of the transaction
(e.g., sale or lease). The term "user" will designate the party obtaining such products
or services. The terms "buyer," "seller," "lessor," and "lessee" will also be used
where the context requires.
11. "Hardware" refers to the computer machinery and "software" refers to the
machine-readable versions of computer programs used to operate the hardware. See
Law Research Serv., Inc. v. General Automation, Inc., 494 F.2d 202, 204 n.3 (2d Cir.
1974) ("software" includes the punch cards, memory tapes, and paper tapes programmed to instruct the computer); Corn-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F.
Supp. 1229 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972)
("software" refers to the programs and controls which are used in the computer);
Honeywell, Inc. v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 406, 408 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (defines "hardware" and "software" and complains of the lack of clarity in the "jargon"
used in the computer industry).
"Software" is often given a more expansive meaning to include "human-readable" versions of programs and related documentation and operation manuals. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 527 (5th Cir. 1974);
Accountants Computer Serv., Inc. v. Kosydar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 120, 723-24, 298 N.E.2d
519, 522 (1973). Its meaning may even be expanded to include "support" services
such as advice, programming assistance, and engineering help. Honeywell, Inc. v.
Lithonia Lighting, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 406, 408 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
"Firmware" is a relatively new term in the computer industry and generally refers to software which has been embodied on non-erasable ("read-only") semiconductor memory chips. See In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 809 (C.C.P.A. 1979), cert.
granted sub. nom. Diamond v. Bradley, 445 U.S. 926 (1980). Cf.Data Cash Sys., Inc. v.
1979), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
JS&A Group, 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill.
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avoid these pitfalls and will discuss the basic legal issues involved
in the procurement of a major system.
II.

RECOMMENDED APPROACH

A. NEGOTIATION
A user procuring a major computer system can protect itself.
Initially the prospective computer user must enter procurement negotiations with a plan of action. To formulate an effective plan, the
user must appreciate the nature of the negotiations. A user who
commits substantial resources prior to commencing negotiations
with a vendor who has expended very little resources is already at a
strategic disadvantage. A user who commits itself irretrievably to
one vendor or lets it be known to the vendor that it is the primary
choice will have little bargaining power. A user who is not prepared
to terminate negotiations with an unresponsive vendor or to make
vendors compete for its business will be forced to compromise its
position whenever the vendor resists suggested changes. A user
who trades tough contract provisions regarding installation and
maintenance for price concessions may find itself being penny wise
and pound foolish.
The user should negotiate a contract that addresses three goals:
timely delivery of an acceptable system, timely delivery of acceptable maintenance services, and timely delivery of software support
services. Timely delivery can be accomplished through inclusion of
functional specifications, a project timetable, and acceptance testing
procedures in the contract. Timely delivery of acceptable maintenance services may be provided for by up-time and response time
commitments and replacement clauses. Timely support can be encouraged by contract provisions similar to burdensome maintenance
provisions, but because of the nature of software, the contract
should also provide for acquisition of source code (in the proper circumstance) and protection against proprietary rights infringement
actions. A user who is willing to negotiate carefully and to use the
approach that follows to achieve these goals should be able to obtain
procurement agreements that will greatly reduce the risk that the
computer installation will not succeed.
B.

PROCUREMENT PROVISIONS

1. FunctionalSpecifications
The first step in the recommended approach is to formulate
functional specifications for the computer system desired. The specifications should be comprehensive, covering the transactions the
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software is intended to implement, the performance criteria of the
particular units of equipment, and the network characteristics which
are created by the interface of the software with the hardware and
of the separate processing units with each other. These specifications are usually developed in three stages: in the user's initial internal review of its needs, in the development and publication of a
"request for proposals" incorporating these internal standards and
requesting bids and proposals from the vendors on how to implement the user's needs, and in discussions between the user's technical staff and the vendor regarding the capabilities of the vendor's
system and how it can be custom-designed to meet the user's needs.
The user should not encounter resistance from a vendor at this
stage of the negotiations and should be suspicious of the vendor's
ability to meet the user's needs if such resistance is met. It is to the
vendor's advantage to agree to specification of all functional characteristics of the system. The specifications will protect the vendor in
the event that a disagreement arises in the future. Many difficulties
which can develop from a computer system procurement can be
avoided if both parties detail what the user desires and what the
vendor is able to provide prior to the actual development of the
software and the installation of the hardware.
Creating and negotiating the specifications may benefit the user
in ways not directly related to the specific terms of any procurement
contract. It forces the user to consider and integrate this particular
procurement with its other data processing and business activities.
It can educate the user as to what it can realistically expect from the
computer system it is procuring. It can also create a comfortable, although structured, relationship between the parties very early in the
procurement process.
A user should exercise great caution, however, in the manner in
which it proceeds. Execution of the agreement causes the user to
lose much of its bargaining power, for example, the ability to play
alternate vendors off against each other to arrive at the best contract. Accordingly, a user should provide in the contract that any
functional specifications to be developed in the future shall be
drafted in accordance with the user's requirements and will not be
left to mutual agreement. The vendor may balk at what appears to
be an open-ended commitment to the user, but the user's ability to
specify its requirements can be limited by general good faith or reasonableness standards, by reference to the user's initial written "request for proposals," by reference to the vendor's proposal, or by
reference to a general description of the vendor's software package
and the types of transactions for which it can be modified.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL
2.

[Vol. III

Project Timetable

The second step in the recommended approach is to create a
project timetable which describes the major tasks to be completed
by the vendor and the deadlines for such completion. The timetable
should be incorporated into the agreement, and the vendor's obligation to meet the various deadlines or at least the most critical ones
should be definite.
Typically, the critical dates are the date for completion of the
functional specifications, the date for completion of all programming, usually combined with a test of the programs on a test system, the deadline for installation, and the date by which final
acceptance testing is to be completed to the satisfaction of the user.
Whenever possible, the user should insist upon a completion
date for development of the functional specifications that is early
enough in the project timetable to allow the user to return to the
marketplace to discuss system procurement with other vendors.
Further, it is important for the user to retain the option to terminate
the agreement if the user's desired specifications cannot be met by
the vendor.
In an industry where firm delivery dates are uncommon, the
user may have to begin the procurement process well in advance of
its expected date of live operation. Such foresight will enable the
prospective user to find a vendor capable of making a commitment
to a firm delivery date.
Invariably, the vendor resists the imposition of firm deadlines
strenuously. Firm deadlines can be established by making time of
the essence in the contract. Alternatively, the contract may specify
very clear remedies for the vendor's failure to meet any critical
dates.
To be practical, these remedies must be other than termination
or litigation. Termination is rarely the best alternative where a user
has committed substantial resources to the particular computer system and no longer has the time, energy or desire to return to the
marketplace to procure an alternate system. Indeed, many vendors
will give termination rights at various points in the project timetable, knowing full well that the user will be more willing to waive the
firm deadline rather than attempt to procure the system elsewhere. 12 The user should, therefore, consider remedies short of ter12. A more subtle vendor will allow firm dates in return for a short period in
which to exercise the right to terminate (typically thirty days), knowing full well that
the user is unlikely to make a decision to terminate within that thirty-day period, but
may be placed in the uncomfortable position of having waived its right to terminate,
and yet face the obligation to make payments without having a functioning system. A
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mination or litigation which will help ensure proper compliance with
the firm dates and the project timetable. These may include a
speedy arbitration procedure, liquidated damages, credits or other
rights to offset against payment, or other contractual remedies.
3. Acceptance Testing
The third step in the recommended approach is agreement on
the appropriate acceptance test or tests for the system and its components. Testing and acceptance of a computer system are of critical importance. A computer system can seldom be simply plugged
in and turned on. While many performance problems are to be expected and can be cured by installation and maintenance service,
other problems, particularly with custom-designed software or new
models of equipment, can be intractable. The user should therefore
insist upon a specified acceptance test for the completed system.
Theoretically, a "user satisfaction" test is most optimal. The
user may terminate the agreement for any reason so long as the termination is in good faith. Termination is not a useful remedy, however, if the user has already invested substantial time and effort in a
particular vendor's system. Additionally, the user may have deadlines requiring a functional computer system and may have no time
to find or change to an alternative system. The user would probably
prefer that the vendor cure any defects in the system. Thus, ironically, the vagueness of the satisfaction provision may operate to the
user's disadvantage. The vendor may argue that it provided all it
was obligated to provide under the contract, and the user is asking
for new specifications or new features.
To avoid this problem, the user should design an acceptance
test which incorporates the functional specifications previously created. The user should negotiate for the strongest standard of compliance agreeable to the vendor. Usually, substantial compliance is
sufficient as problems which can be corrected by normal installation, maintenance or software support services would not interfere
with acceptance. The user should also be aware that acceptance
testing is a dynamic process. A system which works correctly one
day may fail the next. Thus, the period of testing must last at least
as long as the normal cycle time for processing the transactions contemplated for the system. It is also necessary to allow for a "burnin" period of the equipment, understanding that some units may
never function ("dead on arrival") or may have most of their functioning problems in the first several weeks of use ("infant mortaltruly subtle vendor will, in addition, upon exercise of the termination rights, ask for
waiver of any claims for breach.
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I

ity"). The testing period should, therefore, be long enough to detect
these defects.
The user should not place great reliance upon preinstallation
demonstrations of the software. The software may correctly execute
all transactions in the demonstration, but be inefficient when combined with an operational computer system. Usually, such software
efficiency can only be determined by operation of the complete
13
system.
Finally, the user should condition any payments upon satisfactory completion of the acceptance test. 14 Almost universally, payment for a vendor's system will be independent of any final
acceptance procedures. Payment may be specified as due within a
specific time period after completion of the software, or more typically, within some period after completion of installation of the
hardware. Often the best payment strategy from the point of view
of the user is to allow for a partial payment upon satisfactory demonstration of the completion of the software, a substantial payment
upon satisfactory demonstration of completion of the complete system acceptance test, and a final payment of perhaps 10% of the total
price upon completion of all remaining obligations such as training,
documentation and correction of all minor problems which may
15
have arisen during the acceptance test.
C.

MAINTENANCE PROVISIONS

The proper structuring of a maintenance arrangement should be
an important consideration in the procurement process. Indeed, in
the long run, adequate maintenance may be more important than
meeting firm delivery dates or having a "state of the art" system.
The above three steps in the recommended approach concentrate on
assuring timely delivery of an accepted system. The following three
13. For example, consider the situation of the user reported in Laberis, supra
note 6, in which a demonstration model of the system did in fifteen minutes what the
purchased system could not do in less then four hours.
14. See ARB, Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
15. Surprisingly, the partial payment upon satisfactory completion of the
software, even if it is made well prior to the final acceptance test, is often to the advantage of the user as well as the vendor, for its not only aids the relationship between the parties and makes the concept of a project timetable easier to sell to the
vendor, but also tends to encourage quicker completion of the software by the vendor. Early completion lowers the risk that the vendor will be unable to have the complete system prepared by the commencement of the final acceptance test. Usually
the earlier the user can have completed both the functional specifications and the
software incorporating the specifications, the less likely it is that the vendor will be
unable to provide an operating system. In such a situation, any difficulties or overselling by the vendor will be determined early in the procurement process.
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steps focus on assuring the timely delivery of acceptable maintenance services.
1. Long-Term Maintenance Commitment
The user should insist upon a long-term maintenance commitment in the negotiated contract. Form maintenance agreements are
typically considered one-sided because the vendor provides itself
with various ways to avoid meeting its maintenance obligations.
Maintenance suppliers often give themselves the absolute right to
terminate maintenance after a specified initial term and upon a period of prior written notice. Initially, then, if the agreement is intended to operate over the five to seven year life of the equipment
and certain concessions are granted by the supplier in the agreement, the user should be careful that these concessions are not lost
due to the exercise of this termination right by the supplier.
In addition, maintenance suppliers often give themselves the
absolute right to increase maintenance charges after the same initial
term and upon the same period of prior written notice. The user
should, therefore, insist upon some type of price protection. In
times of high inflation or uncertainty over future inflation rates,
price protection may be difficult to obtain. It may be sufficient to
specify that increases in maintenance charges will not be more than
any increases made for maintenance services on like equipment to
the other customers of the vendor. Without such protection, the
supplier would be able to force the user to terminate the maintenance agreement prematurely by unreasonably high increases in
the price of maintenance.
2.

Up-Time Commitment

The fifth step in the recommended approach and the key element in any user-oriented maintenance agreement is a commitment
by the supplier of maintenance services to standards of maintenance timeliness. 16 The typical standards of such performance are
response times, combinations of response and repair times, or guarantees of overall up-time for the system. In general, an overall up16. The user should not feel content to rely upon a warranty to keep the equipment in "good working order." In Renfro Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. National Cash Register
Co., 552 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1977), for example, this warranty proved virtually meaningless for, despite an alleged poor maintenance record, evidence of statistics on the reliability of like equipment was held not admissible to establish an objective standard
of "good working order." See also IBM Corp. v. Florida Dep't. of Gen. Ser., 7 Computer L Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 495 (1979), where the provision in a bid that BM
would respond "promptly" to requests for maintenance was held not to be responsive
to the proposed standard of responding within one hour.
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time or effectiveness level guarantee is precisely what the user
.desires, and this guarantee can provide better protection than specified response times. 17 A short time period for responses (typically
two hours) can be more important than an overall up-time guarantee for the entire system, particularly with respect to critical
problems at important installations. The frequency of certain types
of failures may be relevant in addition to overall up-time of the system. Up-time guarantees may be desirable for individual components or installations as well as for the entire system or network.
Merely defining the standards, however, may not be sufficient
for a user's purposes. The standard vendor form agreements typically include force majeure or "acts of God" clauses which excuse
the vendor's failure to perform under certain circumstances. These
clauses can be a mechanism for avoiding the standards of performance. The user or its attorney should be careful to consider the language of such clauses and amend them if necessary. In addition, if
the user's remedies are limited to termination and litigation, the
standards have no practical effect despite any technical breach because the cost of litigation will almost always be much higher than
the value lost by non-conformity with the standards. Accordingly,
the user should consider mechanisms short of litigation to help ensure proper compliance with the standards. These may include a
speedy arbitration procedure, liquidated damages, credits or other
rights to offset against the maintenance fees or lease payments, or
other such contractual remedies. The user should also be prepared
to pay an increased maintenance fee for having such accelerated or
guaranteed response or up-time. The value of such guarantees and
accelerated responses to problems would probably exceed the actual increased cost.
3.

Replacement of "Lemons"

The sixth step in the recommended approach is to specify in the
maintenance agreement those types of failures which occur too frequently to be normal; that is, that indicate the unit of equipment is a
"lemon." Standards for classifying equipment as lemons depend to
a great extent upon the nature and the history of performance of the
equipment. This determination may be based upon a certain
number of failures over a lengthy time period, a certain number of
failures greater than the number determined by the overall mean
time between failure of such equipment, too many failures over a
short time period, or some combination thereof. Although it is to a
17. R. BERNACCHI & G. LARSEN, DATA PROCESSING CONTRACTS AND THE LAw 576-85

(1974).
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supplier's advantage to replace equipment that is burdening its
maintenance personnel, a user and its supplier may disagree as to
when such burden justifies replacement. Further, the disruption of
the user's installation may be more inconvenient and costly than the
increased cost to the supplier of continually maintaining the equipement. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable for the user to insist upon
such lemon provisions.
In this context, however, a user should not overlook a loophole
in most standard form agreements: a refurbishment clause which
may be invoked by the supplier at its discretion. Rather than replacing the equipment under the lemon provision, a supplier may
prefer to invoke the refurbishment right and charge the cost to the
user. Accordingly, the maintenance agreement should be carefully
analyzed and amended to eliminate or limit the use of the refurbishment clause.
A user should also consider self-help. If the present trend toward decreasing hardware costs and increasing labor costs continues, it may be less expensive for a user to purchase or have the
right to purchase spare units of equipment and to train its personnel
to replace such units in the event of any equipment malfunction
rather than to pay the steadily increasing maintenance charges for
maintenance service.

D. SOFTWARE PROVISIONS
1. Software Support
The seventh step in the recommended approach is applying the
requirements of maintenance to software support. This can be done
by including software problems in measurement of downtime or of
"lemons." The user can also consider establishing standards of
software support performance comparable to those established for
hardware maintenance. Some type of quick response in the event of
a critical problem caused by a defect in the software would be most
useful. Telephonic communication is often sufficient to resolve the
problem. In software that is utilized in many locations with only
moderate customizing, a critical defect usually will have been previously brought to the attention of the software vendor. The vendor
may have already created a correction or patch. Otherwise, the user
should consider the appropriateness of on-location programming
help.
Many software problems arise from improvements to (embodied
in "new releases" of) the software. In many cases, the old version of
the program may work adequately. Accordingly, the user should
ask for the right to retain the old version. If the new release devel-
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ops a defect, the user probably could satisfy most of its business
needs temporarily by reloading the previous release and awaiting
future correction of the defects in the new release by the software
vendor. In order to acquire both the right to retain back-up copies
and to store past versions of it, the user may have to carefully review and modify the scope of use and confidentiality provisions of
the software license.
Since software problems are not as easy to remedy as hardware
problems, some accomodation may have to be made by the user, but
the user should understand that if the vendor promises a working
system and the user relies on this statement, the reasons for the deficient system are not necessarily a justification for the vendor not
compensating the user for its damages.
2.

Source Code

The eighth step in the recommended approach is having access
to the source code and other source materials used by the vendor to
create the software. Key software can be the family jewels of a computer company. The value of the software is best preserved by
18
If a
keeping its human-readable versions ("source code") secret.
particular software package is essential to the user's business, however, it may wish to have possession of the source code in order to
avoid having to rely on the software support services of the vendor
to maintain the credibility and applicability of the software.
The source code problem is difficult to solve because the
software industry is understandably reluctant to reveal its secrets.
Many vendors have placed their source codes in escrow for safety
and will agree to release the source codes from escrow only if the
vendor is insolvent, is discontinuing the particular business involving the source code, or has been doing an inadequate job of maintaining and supporting the software. 19 Such arrangements are
better than merely retaining the right to the source code because a
trustee has substantial powers to avoid the effect of such clauses
under the new Bankruptcy Code. 20 Nevertheless, even the escrow
arrangement may not function adequately. Escrow agencies are
naturally reluctant to release the protected property without substantial proof that the conditions have been satisfied. By the time
the necessary facts can be established, the user's business may
have been substantially impaired, and the trustee in bankruptcy
18. Id. at 574, 579.
19. See Gilburne, Source Code Escrows: Meaningful Solutions or Inadequate Protection?, 4 CNReport, Issue 6, at 4-8 (1981).
20. If U.S.C. § 365 (1978).
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may have established control over the source code. Other arrangements to secure confidential information are possible but may depend upon a higher than normal degree of trust between the parties.
Therefore, the user should carefully consider the importance of
the software, its own ability to utilize the source code to maintain
the software, the possibility of poor maintenance by the vendor, and
the appropriate mechanism for securing access to the source code.
Since proper maintenance of the software will obviate the need for
access to the source code, the user should also rely upon the
software support mechanisms noted above.
3.

Indemnity

The ninth and last step in the recommended approach is obtaining proprietary rights or intellectual property infringement action indemnity. Key software is often so valuable that its owner will
have an incentive to pursue all possible claims for proprietary rights
infringement. The user should be particularly concerned since
many software technicians may change jobs several times during
their careers and may have brought with them many ideas that were
proprietary to their past employers and which could lead to a proprietary rights infringement action against the user. Therefore, the
user in a procurement situtation should be concerned about acquiring proprietary rights to the source code when the vendor is not providing sufficient support services. The user should have a
comprehensive proprietary rights infringement action indemnity
from the appropriate vendors to protect itself in the event of any infringement action by a third party.
A comprehensive indemnity would include the following components: (1) a warranty that the vendor has the right to license the
software and supply the hardware; (2) a warranty that the vendor is
not aware of any infringement or basis for an infringement of any
patent, copyright, trade secret, or other proprietary right in the
software or hardware that it is supplying; (3) a covenant to indemnify the user for all damages, costs, attorneys' fees, and other losses
suffered by the user in any infringement action brought against it
for use or possession of the software or hardware; and (4) a limitation on the vendor's right to unilaterally discontinue the software license or remove the equipment in the event of an infringement.
A non-disclaimable warranty of title and right to license the
software and supply the hardware and a warranty that the software
and hardware will be delivered free of any infringement claims is
normally provided by the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter
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"U.C.C."). 2 1 Despite the U.C.C., these warranties should be included
in the final written contract since it is possible that the U.C.C. may
not apply to software purchases or leases. 2 2 In addition, the U.C.C.
warranties may not be available in the context of the user supplying
its custom-designed requirements to the vendor for software. 23 The
scope and application of these U.C.C. warranties is therefore not
24
clear.
Software vendors usually provide an indemnity provision in
their form contracts. The user should assure itself that the vendor's
indemnity is comprehensive. Typically, these indemnities cover
only hardware and only patent or sometimes patent and copyright
infringement actions. To be comprehensive, indemnities should
cover hardware, software, and the full panoply of possible proprietary rights infringement actions such as United States or foreign
patents, United States or foreign copyrights, trade secret rights, proprietary rights of third parties based upon contract or otherwise,
and trademark or trade name rights in the appropriate context. It is
particularly important that software be covered and that the
software be protected by a trade secret indemnity because the vast
body of software is now protected under trade secret law or under
general proprietary rights created by contract. 2 5 A vendor form
agreement may also limit the indemnity to certain types of damages,
and even if it covers all possible damages which may be suffered, it
may limit them to those "finally" awarded. The user may still suffer
liability from an interim or unstayed award before the case has been
fully appealed and litigated.
The vendor form indemnity typically does not apply to use of
the infringing items in combination with other vendors' hardware or
software, to misuse of the software, or to versions of the software.
The user should insist that these limitations only apply "to the extent" that the infringement is caused by use in combination with
other vendors' software or hardware, by misuse, or because of alteration of the software.
The most subtle problem arises where the vendor retains the
21. U.C.C. § 2-312 (1977).
22. See text accompanying infra notes 27-32.
23. U.C.C. § 2-312. If the seller specially manufactures the goods to the buyer's
specifications, then the buyer is held to warrant its right to request such manufacture. This type of reversal of the warranty is not appropriate in the context of most
computer system procurements, for the customizing is generally a minor part of the
software and the basis for the infringement would be in the part of the software
which is not being customized.
24. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, infra note 55, at 299-303.
25. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.

1982]

NEGOTIATING PROCUREMENTS

right, in the event of an infringement, to attempt to acquire the proprietary rights from the third party, to modify its software to make it
non-infringing, or to simply "discontinue" the license of the
software. It is somewhat unsettling for a user to spend substantial
energy and resources on a particular system and yet suddenly find
that the complete system will be removed because the vendor infringed some other party's proprietary rights. The user should at
least insist that, before any license is discontinued, the vendor attempt to eliminate the infringement or acquire the proprietary
rights in question. In addition, the user should demand that, upon
discontinuance, it be entitled to a refund of its purchase price, amortized over the period of the product's expected use. Finally, the user
should include language which obligates the vendor to pay any incidental or reprocurement (cover) costs necessitated by the discontinuance of the software.
III. BASIC LEGAL ISSUES
In any procurement of a computer system, there are six basic legal areas which may substantially affect the user's rights. These areas address the questions of what understandings between the
parties constitute the complete agreement, what warranties are being made by the vendor, what remedies the user will be entitled to
upon breach by the vendor, when equipment is accepted, when payment is due, and what law applies in interpreting the agreement.
Vendor standard form agreements are considered by some to be
one-sided and often do not deal with these questions in a fair manner because they are drafted solely to protect the vendor. Typically,
a standard vendor contract will exclude any agreements except
those embodied in the terms of the form contract, will disclaim all
warranties except a limited duration warranty of repair and replacement of defective equipment, will place the risk of any consequential damages upon the user, will substantially remove the user's right
to reject defective equipment, will use the U.C.C. to limit the time
period in which the user may bring any action for breach to as little
as one year, and will provide limited access to proprietary materials
with an indemnity for proprietary rights infringement actions which
appears reasonable but may have substantial loopholes.
In effect, the risk of an untimely, inadequate, malfunctioning or
just plain unacceptable computer system installation is placed almost entirely upon the user. Accordingly, the user must consider
carefully the following issues when reviewing form agreements.
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APPLICABILITY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

A computer user's rights ultimately depend upon the nature of
and whether the transaction is governed by Article 2
the transaction
26
of the U.C.C.
1. Software
Section 2-102 of the U.C.C. limits the scope of Article 2 to "transactions in goods. ' 27 "Goods" are defined in the U.C.C. as "all things
(including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the
time of identification to the contract. '28 Computer hardware products are clearly "goods" for purposes of Article 2, but the question of
whether various forms of computer software products are "goods"
has caused considerable debate and confusion. 2 9 Although the reasoning may be somewhat tortured, 30 courts generally have had little
26. Since the U.C.C. has been adopted with some variations in all states except
Louisiana, and is also in effect in the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands
IU.C.C. (1 U.LA 1) (1976 & Supp. 1982)], transactions covered by the U.C.C. may be
presumed to be subject to at least a modicum of uniform treatment in any of the
U.C.C. jurisdictions. In addition, a computer vendor in most transactions will be considered a "merchant" under the definition of section 2-104(1), which provides that a
merchant is "a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise holds himself out
as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction . . . ." The U.C.C. places different and often higher responsibilities on a
merchant than a non-merchant vendor. See generally U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 2. In
particular, a merchant vendor is bound not only to act in good faith but to observe
"reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (b).
This section may provide the basis (in lieu of or in addition to any fraud claims) for
avoiding a demurrer or motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule
12(b) (6), for failure to state a claim, or under Rule 56, summary judgment), and for
avoiding the parol evidence rule.
27. Note, however, that certain specific provisions of Article 2, by their terms, apply to the "sale" of goods rather than "transactions" in goods. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2204, 2-205, and 2-206.
28. 28 U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
29. See Note, Computer Software as Goods Under the U.C.C., 77 MIcH. L. REV.
1149 (1979) for an excellent discussion of one point of view.
30. See Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, 769
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), where the court observed that the purchase of custom-designed
software involved the purchase of a product of ideas and that the product, 'though
intangible, is more readily characterized as 'goods' than 'services.'"
Such analysis is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of software and
software licenses. The transfer of a computer program, like the transfer of other
products created through intellectual endeavor, may involve the transfer of intangible
elements, of tangible media, or of both; but the distinction between the two concepts
is not difficult to draw and is frequently made in other areas of the law. For example,
the copyright as a literary work is intangible, but the physical embodiment of the literary work in the form of a particular copy of a book is tangible. The Copyright Act
(17 U.S.C. §§ 101-702 (1976)) recognizes that the transfer of an intangible copyright
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difficulty in concluding that software procured in connection with
computer hardware is subject to the provisions of Article 2.31
2. Leases

Although sales of computer hardware are clearly subject to the
provisions of Article 2, leases are not invariably so treated, and the
applicability of Article 2 may depend on the particular circumstances surrounding the transaction. In recent years, the trend
clearly has been toward treating leases as subject to the provisions
of Article 2. As the court observed in Hertz Commercial Leasing
Corp. v. TransportationCredit ClearingHouse,32 the economic effect
and the transfer of a tangible copy of a copyrighted work such as a book are different
types of transactions, and that one does not necessarily imply the other. 17 U.S.C.
§§ 109(a), (c). Just as one may buy a copy of a book in the tangible form of ink on
paper and bound with glue without acquiring any rights in the intangible copyright of
the underlying work, so a computer user may acquire a tangible copy of a program in
the form of a magnetic disc or tape or as electrical impulses without acquiring any
copyright or other proprietary rights to the program. See generally Note, supra note
29, at 1152-53.
Although the district court in Triangle Underwritersreached the appropriate conclusion that the software which was procured was goods, it failed to recognize the
simple fact that Triangle did not purchase an "intangible" which nonetheless was
subject to characterization as goods; it purchased a physical copy of various programs
in which Honeywell apparently expressly reserved all "intellectual property" proprietary rights. See 457 F. Supp. at 769. See also Note, supra note 29, at 1150-51 n.11.
31. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 744-45 (2d Cir.
1979); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 740-41 n.1
(D.N.J. 1979). If the program is actually in the machine when sold, the courts consider it merely part of the machine. These cases often do not mention computer-contained programs. See, e.g., Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp.
39 (D.S.C. 1974); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1972).
Furthermore, where the programs are part of the contract for the computer but are to
be delivered at a later time, the court considers the obligation to deliver the programs
incidental to the sale of the computers and hold that the entire transaction is under
the U.C.C. Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa.
1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974) (U.C.C. applied to a "bundled" contract--.e.,
the purchase price includes the seller's programming services, whether or not the
buyer wishes to use them); Burroughs Corp. v. Joseph Uram Jewelers, Inc., 305 So. 2d
215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). Cf. Public Util. Comm'n v. Burroughs Bus. Mach. Ltd.,
34 D.L.R.3d 320, 2 O.R. 472 (Ont. 1973); Burroughs Bus. Mach. Ltd. v. Feed-Rite Mills
(1962) Ltd., 42 D.LR.3d 303 (Q. B. Manch. 1973) (Canadian cases, under the Canadian
Sale of Goods Act, both reaching similar results). See also F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v.
Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 988, 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), UARCO, Inc. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 414 F. Supp. 1219, 1221 (E.D. La. 1976). In W. R. Weaver Co. v.
Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), the U.C.C. was applied to a
software contract executed separately from an equipment lease, but neither party
contested its applicability.
32. 59 Misc. 2d 226, 229, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392, 398 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 64
Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1970).
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of most commercial leases is to place the lessee in the position of a
purchaser, since the lessee pays the equivalent of the full purchase
price plus interest during the initial lease term. The court concluded that it would be anomalous if this large body of commercial
transactions was subject to different rules of law than other commercial transactions which tend to lead to the identical economic result.33 Accordingly, leases which are entered into as financing
vehicles in lieu of purchases, whether directly from the vendor or
from a third-party lessor, will often be governed by Article 2. 3 4 Article 2 is less likely to be applied when the lease fails to provide for an
option to purchase (whether direct, or indirect, as in leases which
provide for renewal at nominal rents) 35 or where the lease term is
36
relatively short.
On the other hand, Article 2 will not be applied invariably to
leases which are intended as financing vehicles. Section 2-102 expressly excludes from the application of Article 2 "any transaction
which although in the form of an unconditional contract to sell or
present sale is intended to operate only as a security transaction."
In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Starline Overseas
Corp.,37 two corporate entities negotiated a contract which required
33. Id. at 228, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
34. See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 742
(D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Convalescent
Home of the First Church of Deliverance, 49 Ill. App. 3d 213, 366 N.E.2d 1285 (1977);
Atlas Indus., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 216 Kan. 213, 531 P.2d 41 (1975).
35. See, e.g., Teamsters Sec. Fund v. Sperry Rand Corp., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep.
(Callahan) 951, 972 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (Univac form lease held not to be subject to California U.C.C.). See also W. R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979) (noted in dictum without explanation that Burroughs' form lease of
equipment not subject to Texas U.C.C.); O.J. & C. Co. v. General Hosp. Leasing, Inc.,
578 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (five-year third-party lease with option to renew but no option to purchase held not governed by the U.C.C. "which is expressly
limited in scope to sales").
36. Leases that have been considered transactions under the U.C.C. have generally been of long duration, on the order of several years. For instance, a five-year
lease was involved in Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit
Clearing House, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1969). In Glenn Dick Equip.
Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184 (1975), the court applied the
U.C.C. to a two-month rental of dirt-moving machines. Usually, however, courts apply
it to shorter leases either in part only or by analogy. See Washwell, Inc. v. Morejon,
294 So. 2d 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (implied warranty of fitness covered the use of
coin-operated washing machine; no mention of the U.C.C.); Baker v. City of Seattle,
70 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971) (U.C.C. applied in part to the rental of a golf cart
for several hours); W. E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98
(Fla. 1970) (the U.C.C. applied to a month-to-month lease of equipment as a matter of
public policy).
37. 346 Misc. 2d 288, 74 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1973).
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one corporation to purchase a billing machine and lease it to the
other. The type of machine and the identity of the seller were specified by the lessee, and at the end of an initial sixty-five month lease
term, the lessee had the option to renew the purported lease for a
relatively nominal consideration. 38 The court held the agreement to
be a title retention contract and lease under Article 9 of the U.C.C.
and not a contract for the sale of goods under Article 2. This conclusion was neither clearly compelled by the facts, as the dissenting
opinion in Leasco observed,3 9 nor by the intent of the U.C.C. which
apparently is to exclude such leases only when they are intended
solely as financing arrangements. 4° A factually similar case, Citicorp
Leasing, Inc. v. Allied Institutional Distributors,Inc.,41 involved a
seventy-two month lease of computer equipment with an option to
renew for a relatively nominal sum. Unlike in Leasco, the court in
Citicorp held that while the lease in question was a security agreement under Article 9, it also constituted a conditional sale subject to
the provisions of Article 2.
Most computer system leases are appropriate transactions for
application of the U.C.C. even when the lease is not structured as a
conditional sale or financing vehicle. The lessee must commit substantial resources to the selection, procurement, and installation of
the computer system and the ongoing use of the system will usually
require employment of business practices and procedures consistent with the capabilities of the system. As a consequence, the
lessee is virtually locked into the particular system it installs. Even
if the lease is short-term, and the lessee intends to upgrade the system within a few years, the upgrade will tend to be with compatible
equipment from the same manufacturer. Viewing the complete series of transactions as a whole, the economic impact is equivalent to
a purchase of a large system with changes in particular components
of that system. In an industry where rapid technological change and
38. Id. at 289. The lease was to run for sixty-five months at a fixed monthly rental
of $274.20, with the lessee having the option to renew thereafter for a yearly rental of
$274.20. The lessor apparently paid $13,710 to purchase the machine and would have
received from the lessee payments totalling $17,823 by the end of the initial sixty-five
months.
39. Id. at 291-95. Cf. Computer Sciences Corp. v. Sci-Tek, Inc., 367 A.2d 658 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1976) (computer lease was security agreement where, among other things,
lessor acquired security interest in computer equipment other than the leased
equipment).
40. All-States Leasing Co. v. Ochs, 42 Ore. App. 319, 600 P.2d 899 (1979) (the exclusion from Article 2 of security transactions was meant to apply only where collateral
is transferred solely as security).
41. 454 F. Supp. 511, 515-17 (W.D. Okla. 1977). See also Lectro Management, Inc. v.
Freeman, Everett & Co., 135 Vt. 213, 373 A.2d 544 (1977).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. III

system improvements are commonplace, the application of the law
should be flexible, especially when the policy of that law dictates
that it is to be "liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."' '
Contracts providing for data processing services, rather than the
sale or lease of goods, generally do not fall within the scope of Article 2.43 Although the extent and nature of such services may be critical, the installation, systems support and programming services
incidental to a sale or lease of computer hardware or software
should not render Article 2 inapplicable."
Even when the U.C.C. is not directly applicable, the reasoning
and policy of the U.C.C. are often applied by analogy in order to effectuate a reasonable level of uniformity and predictability in commercial transactions. 45 When applied, the U.C.C. provides a set of
guidelines and standards regarding warranties, disclaimers, acceptance, rejection, delivery, parol evidence, damages, and other matters
of critical concern to any party procuring a computer product.
3. Statute of Limitations
One of the most important U.C.C. provisions is the statute of
limitations for contract actions. Section 2-725 requires that contract
actions be commenced within four years after the cause of action
arises and allows the parties to contractually reduce the period of
limitation to one year. Vendors often insist upon a one year limitation period6 because of a perception that the user will not commence litigation until long after the original breach by the vendor.
Actually, users typically attempt to resolve the problem amicably
rather than resort to litigation. In addition, the vendor's breach
often occurs before payment is due; accordingly, a vendor may com42. U.C.C. § 1-102.
43. Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653, 655 (D.S.C.
1970), aJ'd,443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971).
44. See Note, supra note 29, at 1157-64.
45. U.C.C. § 1-102, comment 1. See All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873,
877, 538 P.2d 1177, 1181 (1975) (discussing the extension of U.C.C. warranties by analogy); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Convalescent Home of the Church of the First DeliverApp. 3d 213, 366 N.E.2d 1285 (1977); Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77
ance, 49 Ill.
Misc. 2d 992, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1974) (U.C.C. applied in full to a lease of scaffolding
equipment for several weeks), rev'd mem., 50 A.D.2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1974)

(while the U.C.C. implied warranty could apply, the U.C.C. statute of limitations
should not). Cf.United States Leasing Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apts., Inc., 65 Misc. 2d
1082, 319 N.Y.S.2d 531, 535 (1971) (noted that the U.C.C. provision on unconscionability had much broader application than merely to sales transactions). See generally R.
BERNACCHI & G. LARSEN, supra note 17, at 138.39.
46. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. Catamore Enter., 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1976).
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mence an action for nonpayment after the contractual statute of limitations applicable to the vendor's breach has expired.
In Triangle Underwriters,Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,47 for example,
Triangle's contract claims were held to be barred by the four-year
statute of limitations. The applicability of the U.C.C. was the key to
this holding. Under New York law, there is a four-year limitations
period for actions under the U.C.C. and a six-year period applicable
to other contracts.4 Triangle argued unsuccessfully that the computer system did not consist solely of "goods" within the meaning of
the U.C.C. because it contained software, that an agreement for
software is predominantly an agreement for "services", and that accordingly the six-year period should apply.
A vendor's further shortening of the limitations period by contract can be even more onerous to the user. For example, in IBM v.
Catamore Enterprises,49 which involved a complicated series of
transactions between IBM and Rhode Island jewelry company,5 0 a
one-year limitation in a written document was held to apply to an
earlier oral agreement which had not been superseded in its entirety by the written agreement. The written agreement partially
covered activities commenced under the oral agreement. The court
held that any breach arising out of the oral agreement properly
arose from non-completion of those parts of the projects begun
under the oral agreement which were to be completed under the
written agreement. Accordingly, the limitations period in the written agreement applied. The court also reached the sweeping conclusion that the one-year limitations clause in the written contract was
effective as the complete and final embodiment of the parties' understanding as to a limitation on the time in which a breach, of contract action could be brought with respect to a second oral
agreement. The court, however, did not conclude that the written
agreement replaced or superseded the two oral contracts in their
5
entirety. '
47. See Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979).
See also text accompanying supra note 1.
48. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. Rules § 213(2) (1966).
49. 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1976).
50. This case was described by the First Circuit Court of Appeals as a "paradigm
of complex litigation, rivalling the complexity of the cybernetic era from which it
arises." Id. at 1066-67.
51. The court apparently concluded that various other provisions in the written
agreement were not inconsistent with provisions of the oral agreements. The court

stated:
We accept the proposition that 'parol evidence, which does not vary or contradict the writing, is admissible to complete the understanding of the parties.' Here, however, we are concerned with the reverse situation: a writing
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STANDARD VENDOR CONTRACT CLAUSES

1. Integration
During negotiations between the user and vendor, the vendor's
sales representatives typically make a wide range of representations
as to the capabilities of their company's hardware and software and
how these capabilities will fulfill the needs of the user. The vendor
usually will provide brochures and specification sheets, written proposals with detailed information, additional letters and memoranda
on specific issues, demonstrations of like systems, and a variety of
oral representations regarding the capabilities of the system and
commitments of the vendor with respect to installation, programming, and maintenance services. All of these representations, demonstrations, statements, and documents can be the basis for
warranties and commitments made by the vendor and relied upon
by the user. 52 The vendor may even create a specific document,
clearly intended to be relied upon by the parties, as one of the bases
53
for their overall understanding and commitment.
When the vendor's form contract is presented for signature,
however, the user almost invariably finds a clause which provides
that there are no understandings or agreements between the parties
except as specified in the written contract and that the vendor has
no obligations to the user except as expressly set forth in the written contract. This merger or integration clause is generally held to
be valid. 54 Merger clauses are enforced essentially to avoid two
types of disputes. 55 If the negotiations were protracted and included
many drafts, the enforcement of the merger clause is intended to
which does not vary or contradict the evidence of the terms of the parol
agreement.
Id. at 1075.
52. U.C.C. § 2-313.
53. See, e.g., W. R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979) (statement of installation conditions).
54. See Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C.
1974); National Cash Register Co. v. Modern Transfer Co., 302 A.2d 486 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1973). Merger clauses and the more general argument that the form agreement is "integrated" and contains all understandings of the parties is less likely to be upheld if
the user commences an action early (before the equipment could be said to have
been accepted) or while there is an otherwise continuing relation between the parties, such that the vendor apparently still considers that it has ongoing obligations
which have not yet been met. See Security Leasing Co. v. Flinco, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 242,
461 P.2d 460 (1969); Burroughs Bus. Mach. Ltd. v. Feed-Rite Mills (1062) Ltd., 42
D.L.R.3d 303 (Q.B. Manch. 1973).
55. J. WHrrE &R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 89-95 (1972). See, e.g., ARB, Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (applying parol evidence rule to protect the user in a heavily-negotiated contract, many prior drafts of which had been prepared).
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prevent an early draft, containing terms which were bargained
away, from being introduced as evidence to contradict the final
agreement. If any unauthorized or overinflated representations
were made by the vendor's sales representatives, the enforcement
of the merger clause prevents the vendor from being bound by the
"puffing" of its sales representatives.
These clauses are enforced by preventing a dissatisfied user
seeking a breach of contract action from introducing parol evidence
of any additional understandings and agreements between the parties.5 6 Usually, the user is relegated to pursuing fraud or other tort
claims and having the damaging evidence introduced solely for the
purpose of supporting these tort claims rather than for the purpose
57
of establishing any contract claims.
A court should be reluctant to conclude that a form agreement
completely incorporates all understandings of the parties relating to
the procurement of a complex computer system unless such matters
as software design, installation services, and any special requirements of the user are specified. In circumstances where such matters are not specified in the final written contract, the courts have
been able to avoid the effect of the exclusion of parol evidence.
In some cases, the form agreement fails to even mention important matters such as programming responsibility. In Carl Beasley
Ford,Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.,58 despite the argument by the vendor
that the equipment sales contract was a complete and final agreement, the court allowed the submission to the jury of evidence that
an oral contract for programming services existed. The court emphasized that there was no mention of such services in the form
contract and that the vendor's representatives had been specifically
instructed to rely upon oral agreements as to programming and not
56. U.C.C. § 2-202. Section 2-202 provides that terms which were intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement may not be contradicted by evidence
of any prior or contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented (i) by course of dealing or usage of trade; (ii) by course of performance; or
(iii) "by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to
have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement."
It is presumed that provisions in a final written contract dealing with a particular
subject are intended to constitute the entire agreement between the parties with respect to that subject, although parol evidence may be introduced where the course of
conduct of the parties suggests that there was an additional understanding between
them which was not dealt with in the written agreement. Security Leasing Co. v.
Flinco, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 242, 461 P.2d 460 (1969).
57. See, e.g., Applications, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 77 Div. 5937 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
58. 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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to incorporate any provisions regarding programming into contracts
59
for the sale of equipment.
Often, however, the mere failure to mention programming is not
sufficient to show that a contract is not a final agreement. 60 In Teamsters Security Fund v. Sperry Rand Corp.,61 a vendor's set of form
contracts covering hardware, software, and maintenance separately
with integration clauses for each were held not to be the complete
understandings of the parties because they did not mention system
software and did not specify the vendor's technical assistance in any
detail. 62 The decisive factor was that the parties had conducted extensive negotiations regarding the system's functional specifications
and the vendor's responsibility for technical assistance, even to the
point of specifying which of the vendor's particular technical employees were to work at each of the buyer's particular installations.
The court did not believe that it was reasonable that following such
careful negotiation, especially in light of the fact that the computer
system itself was still in its developmental stage, the buyer intended
to contractually ignore all these carefully negotiated understandings
and rely upon the mere listing of the hardware procured to describe
63
the vendor's commitments.
Additionally, the court may be inclined to admit parol evidence
where it is written and consistent with the document purported to
be the final and complete agreement. In W. R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp.,64 the court held that the integration clause in the form
agreement was not conclusive on the issue of whether the form contract contained all understandings and commitments of the parties
because the vendor had previously provided the user with a written
Statement of Installation Conditions which contained many of the
specific conditions of the procurement.
The recommended strategy for the user is to turn an integration
clause into a weapon during negotiations by consistent reference to
it and by insisting that all of the understandings of the parties be
incorporated into the final written agreement. A user utilizing the
59. Id. at 332. It is not clear from the opinion whether the Equipment Sale Contract contained a merger clause.
60. See, e.g., Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C.
1974); National Cash Register Co. v. Modern Transfer Co., 302 A.2d 486 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1973).
61. 6 Computer L Serv. Rep. (Callahan) 951 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
62. Id. at 966.
63. Id. at 967. See also Diversified Env't, Inc. v. Olivetti Corp., 41 F. Supp. 286,
291 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (vendor's "Computer Software Acceptance" form contract not the
complete agreement for failure to specify certain services, including training, data
conversion, and hardware installation).
64. 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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basic approach outlined above will have insisted that functional
specifications be drafted and included as part of the agreement. In
addition, the user should insist that any sales brochures, letters, and
documents, including any responses from the vendor to the user's
request for proposals, should be attached to and incorporated into
the agreement. In this manner, the representations and statements
of the vendor's sales representatives which induced the user into
the procurement will be considered in any subsequent litigation
over the interpretation of the agreement.
2. Disclaimerof Warranties
Ordinarily the vendor could be judicially held to have made a
variety of warranties. Most of these will be express warranties, documented in sales brochures and published specifications sheets.
Some warranties are made by the vendor's representatives during
negotiations, and some are created by demonstrations of sample
hardware and software. 65 In addition, the vendor is assumed to
have warranted that it has title to the hardware and software it is
marketing. 66 In certain circumstances, the court may imply a warranty of merchantability, 67 a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,68 or a similar implied warranty. 69 Each of these warranties
can provide a basis upon which a user may be able to negotiate a
favorable settlement or successfully prosecute a breach of warranty
action.
Vendor form contracts, however, typically disclaim all warranties, express or implied. In lieu of these warranties, the form contracts substitute a limited remedy provision in which the user's only
recourse is repair or replacement of malfunctioning items. 70 This
limited warranty is of questionable value in a major acquisition
since the user will undoubtedly execute a maintenance agreement
which will provide the same services as those provided by the lim65. U.C.C. § 2-313.
66. Id. § 2-312.
67. Id. § 2-314.
68. Id. § 2-315.
69. See infra notes 92-95.
70. U.C.C. § 2-719(1). A typical "limited" warranty of a vendor provides for repair
or replacement of defective equipment or parts. See Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74
Misc. 2d 202, 204, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541, 543 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Westfield Chem. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 6 Computer L Serv. Rep. (Callahan) 438, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1293, 1296
(Mass. Super. Ct. 1977)). Such warranty may also provide for correction of any program defects for a short time period. Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register
Corp., 479 F. Supp. 743, 745 (D.NJ. 1979).
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7
ited warranty. '
To avoid the effect of any disclaimer of warranties, the user
should attach or incorporate by reference into the final agreement
all of the documents or statements which possibly could be the basis of express warranties and should insist that all documents
describing the commitments of the parties, including the functional
specifications, expressly be made a part of the agreement. In addition, the user should negotiate for warranty which states that the
vendor has analyzed the needs and requirements of the user and
that the particular system it is offering is suitable and adequate for
those needs. Also, the user should follow the recommended approach regarding maintenance agreements since the standards of
performance in the maintenance agreement provide protection
equivalent to that of a warranty. In particular, an up-time provision
effectively states the standard of reliability of the complete system.
The user should also carefully review the language of the disclaimer in the form agreement and consider whether it affects the
other meaures the user has taken to avoid the impact of the disclaimer. This clause usually includes a disclaimer of all express
warranties except those which may be provided in the agreement
and all implied warranties, including specified types.
The disclaimer of all express warranties is seldom interpreted
literally. If other representations, statements, or warranties are
found to be part of the agreement, these warranties and statements
72
Of
will bind the vendor despite the express warranty disclaimer.
course, if these statements and warranties are not attached to or incorporated into the agreement, and the agreement is held to be the
final and complete expression of the parties' understandings, the parol evidence rule may preclude the introduction into evidence of
such other statements and warranties.
The clause excluding implied warranties, however, will be upheld and interpreted literally if certain formal requirements are satisfied. Under the U.C.C., for example, the implied warranty of

71. Accordingly, a user should negotiate for free or less expensive maintenance
during the period of the limited warranty.
72. U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 4. See, e.g., Teamsters Sec. Fund v. Sperry-Rand
Corp., 6 Computer L Serv. Rep. (Callahan) 951 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (clause disclaiming
"all warranties except as herein expressly stated" held not affecting statements not in
written contract which were found to be express warranties intended by the parties
to be a part of their complete agreement). See also Fargo Machine & Tool Co. v.
Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 371-73 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (exclusionary provision that the limited warranty in the written agreement was "in lieu of any other
warranty whether expressed [sic] or implied" held not effective to disclaim consistent express warranties created by sales materials, technical specifications, and the
demonstration of a model system).
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merchantability may be disclaimed if the disclaimer is conspicuous
and mentions merchantability. The implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose may be disclaimed if the disclaimer is in writing
and conspicuous.7 3 In most vendor form agreements, the exclusionary language is conspicuously placed in a separate paragraph in
large, contrasting type. Such clauses are generally upheld. 74 Occais not sufficiently conspicious
sionally, however, a disclaimer clause
75
or fails to use appropriate language.
Even correctly worded and conspicious disclaimers are not
given full effect in certain circumstances. The vendor form agreement containing the disclaimer may not be the complete agreement
between the parties. 7 6 Similarly, while it may constitute the complete agreement on a particular subject matter, it may not cover
other agreements between the parties; for example, the written
agreement may cover only hardware, and a separate oral agreement
for programming services may be executed by the parties.7" In addition, the very artfulness of the vendor in drafting the standard form
agreement can work to its disadvantage. The general rule of contract construction is that any ambiguities in drafting are resolved
against the drafter. For example, in Chesapeake Petroleum Supply
Co., v. Burroughs Corp.,78 the court held that a form disclaimer on
the reverse of an equipment sale contract was ineffective because of
the ambiguity of the following statement on the front of the contract: 'Terms and Conditions on the Reverse Side are Part of this
Security Agreement. '7 9 The agreement was not intended to be a security agreement, and, applying the general rule of construction, the
court held that the terms and conditions on the reverse side did not
apply.8 0
On the other hand, disclaimers of implied warranties can be
73. U.C.C. § 2-316.
74. See, e.g., Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wisc.
1977): Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39, 45 (D.S.C. 1974);
W. R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Westfield Chem. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 6 Computer L Serv. Rep. (Callahan) 438 (Mass.
Dist. Ct. 1977); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 343 N.Y.S.2d 541, 543-44 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
75. See, e.g., National Cash Register Co. v. Adell Indus., Inc., 57 Mich. App. 413,
225 N.W.2d 785, 787 (1975); All-States Leasing Co. v. Ochs, 42 Ore. App. 319, 600 P.2d
899 (1979). But see W. R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979); Fargo Machine & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 372
(E.D. Mich. 1977).
76. See text accompanying supra notes 54-64.
77. See text accompanying supra notes 59-60.
78. 6 Computer L Serv. Rep. (Callahan) 768 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1977), aff'd, 384 A.2d 734
(Md. App. 1978).
79. Id. at 736.
80. Id. at 736-37. But see Ka1l Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 619 P.2d 1055, 1058
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found even where the agreement contains no disclaimer provision
(or one that is ineffective). This can be understood because of the
contexts in which implied warranties arise.
There are two basic implied warranties: the implied warranty of
merchantability 81 and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 82 Although the two are often confused, 83 there are clear
distinctions between the scope of these warranties. The implied
warranty of merchantability arises under the U.C.C. in the context
of a sales contract in which the seller is a "merchant."
The warranty imposes an obligation on the merchant to supply goods that
85
are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.
This implied warranty is commonly referred to as an implied warranty of "fitness for ordinary purposes, '86 although as so defined, it
is of little value when applied to custom-designed computer
87
systems.
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is narrower but more relevant to computer system procurements than the
implied warranty of merchantability. 88 This warranty aises only if
the vendor "at the time of contracting has reason to know of any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods." 8 9 This situation is very common in the context of
computer system acquisitions, especially when the vendor is dealing
with an unsophisticated user or studies the needs of the user and
provides a detailed proposal to meet those needs. For example, in
Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp.,90 the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose was "clearly" established
where the vendor sent the user a detailed written set of recommendations based upon the vendor's study of the user's needs.
(Ariz. App. 1980) (reaching the opposite conclusion on similar facts, disavowing the
Maryland opinion).
81. U.C.C. § 2-314.

82.
83.
84.
volved
liar to
U.C.C.

Id. § 2-315.
J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 55, at 296-97.
U.C.C. § 2-314(1). Computer vendors which deal in "goods of the kind" inin the transaction or hold themselves out as having "knowledge or skill pecuthe practices or goods involved in the transaction" are "merchants" under
§ 2-104(1).

85. U.C.C. § 2-314(2). There are also other requirements, but those mentioned in
the text are more appropriate to computer equipment than some of the others.
86. J. Wm=TE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 55, at 293.
87. Id. at 297.
88. See, e.g., National Cash Register Co. v. Adell Indus., Inc., 57 Mich. App. 413,

225 N.W.2d 785 (1975).
89. U.C.C. § 2-315.
90. 337 F.2d 363, 366, 369 (5th Cir. 1964).
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Although these two warranties are defined in the U.C.C., comparable warranties have been implied under general contract law 91
and in jurisdictions which have not adopted the U.C.C.92 In addition, the implied warranties of the U.C.C. are intended to be applied
93
by analogy in situations which do not fall under its express terms,
and courts are seldom reluctant to do this.9
When implied warranties are appropriate, they nevertheless
may be limited or excluded even in the absence of an express exclusionary clause. Such exclusion occurs if the user examines the
goods prior to the procurement, if the course of performance between the parties indicates that the implied warranties are inappropriate, or if the implied warranties would be inconsistent with other
express warranties.
If the user examined or had an opportunity to examine the
goods before entering into the contract, the implied warranties
would not apply to any defect the examination might have revealed.95 Inspection of a computer system, however, probably will
not reveal inadequacies or defects, especially if software is to be
custom-designed. Often the system, and in particular the software,
must be operational for some time before all the defects or bugs become apparent. 96 Thus, in Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply
Corp.,97 the court concluded that even though the user had posses91. Id.
92. See, e.g., P.U.C. v. Burroughs Bus. Mach. Ltd., 34 D.LR.3d 320, 2 O.R. 472 (Ont.
1973). See also Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., 359 So. 2d 607 (La. 1978).
93. U.C.C. § 1-102, comment 1.
94. See, e.g., Lovely v. Burroughs Corp., 523 P.2d 557, 559-60 (Mont. 1974), (the
user acquired a computer system from Burroughs in a transaction which the court
characterized as a "bailment for mutual benefit.") The parties at first intended a
purchase agreement, but due to financing considerations, attempted to arrange a
third-party lease. The user was unable to obtain appropriate financing through the
third-party leasing organization it had approached, and although the vendor offered
to lease the equipment (at a higher lease rate than that contemplated in the thirdparty leasing situation), because of the defective operation of the system, the user rejected this offer and the equipment was removed. The court implied a warranty of
fitness for the use for which the property was acquired.
95. U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (b). This "examination" should be clearly distinguished from
"inspection" or "acceptance testing" which occurs after the contract has been executed but before the particular goods have been accepted as conforming to the contract. U.C.C. § 2-316, comment 8. Instead, "examination" is intended to refer to the
selection process of a user before entering into an agreement, such as by inspecting
models and watching demonstrations of a particular computer manufacturer's
equipment.
96. Pezzillo v. GTE Information Sys., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (M.D. Tenn.
1976) (describing process of programming and "debugging"-the curing of program
defects).
97. 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964). Although this case was decided under pre-Code
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sion of the equipment for a considerable time prior to purchase, the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose was still applicable, since the user.
Did not know and did not expect to ascertain, except by use and experiment, the functional abilities and capacities of the electronic
equipment, with its transistors, tubes, and dials, its very colored
maze of wiring, its buttons and switches, and the supplementing of
machines and devices for the punching of cards and others for the
sorting thereof.9 8
Implied warranties may also be excluded by course of performance. 99 As a general principle, a user should be quick to respond to
any defective performance on the part of the vendor, identifying the
particular defects of performance and communicating these defects
in writing to the vendor. Otherwise, the failure to object to a defect
may establish a course of performance, and an acceptance or acquiescence in such performance may have the effect of modifying or excluding any implied warranties.
Implied warranties can also be limited by an inconsistent express warranty. 10 0 For example, if a contract specifies system performance such as speed, uptime, or frequency of repair, the user
probably would not be able to hold the vendor to a higher standard
of performance with respect to any of the specified criteria based on
any implied warranty. The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, however, will not generally be completely disclaimed by
inconsistent express warranties' 0 1 but rather will be deemed cumulative of the express warranties 10 2 and indeed may be created by
them. 0 3 In any event, since implied warranties are typically explicitly disclaimed, the user ordinarily loses nothing by requesting such
express warranties of performance.
3. Limitation of Liability
Another standard clause found in most vendor form contracts is
an exclusion of liability for consequential damages and other limitations on liability. These clauses typically limit the vendor's liability
law, the U.C.C. attempted to incorporated well-established doctrines of pre-Code law
into U.C.C. § 2-316(2) and, accordingly, this case is still important precedent. See
U.C.C. § 2-316, comment 6.
98. 337 F.2d at 363.
99. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(c).
100. Id. § 2-317(c).
101. Id.
102. See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 743 (D.N.J.
1979).
103. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964).
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for damages in the event of a breach in each of the following ways:
(i) a flat ceiling on total liability which is usually the amount paid
by the user under the contract;1°4 (ii) an exclusion of indirect, special or consequential damages; 0 5 and (iii) a limited remedy of repair or replacement. 0 6 Clauses which limit damages are generally
upheld unless they are contrary to public policy10 7 or unconscionable 08 and are quite common in commercial transactions.
The interplay between a disclaimer of warranties, a limitation of
remedies, and a limitation of liability can be complicated. For example, the U.C.C. provides that if a limited remedy clause is provided
but "fails of its essential purpose," the clause is striken from the
agreement and the user is entitled to any of the remedies otherwise
104. See, e.g., Farris Eng'g Corp. v. Service Bureau Corp., 276 F. Supp. 643, 645
(D.N.J. 1967), aff'd, 406 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1969).
105. See Teamsters Sec. Fund v. Sperry Rand Corp., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep.
(Callaghan) 951, 968 (N.D. Cal. 1977). This list at times also includes "incidental" and
"exemplary" damages, "lost profits" and "other pecuniary loss," or a mixture of these
phrases. See infra text accompanying note 127.
106. The limited warranty for remedies provides that in the event of any defect in
any equipment or any part of the equipment, or any error in any program or program
module, the user's sole remedy is repair or replacement of the defective part or attempted correction of the defect in the program module. See, e.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc.
National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 743 (D.N.J. 1979). Limitation of liability issues may also arise in the context of multivendor procurement arrangements. In
Convoy Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 601 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1979), the user contracted
with a computer consultant to design a system for dispatching, traffic routing, and
other operations of its automobile transporter business. On the consultant's recommendation, it leased a particular configuration of equipment from a vendor, who also
agreed to aid in the development of required programming. The lease transaction
was beset with problems, including the need of the user to hire additional programming help; the lack of availability of some of the equipment, requiring different equipment to be utilized during an interim period; conversion problems from the interim
equipment to the desired equipment; and the ultimate irony that when the system
finally worked, it was not more efficient than the original manual system. The user
cancelled the lease and sued both the consultant and the computer vendor. It settled
with the consultant and recovered from the vendor. The vendor appealed on the
ground of double recovery. The court held that recovery from both parties was possible, but placed an upward limit on the possible recovery from the vendor equal to the
difference between the amount of the settlement with the consultant and the total
possible damages to which the user could have been entitled from both wrongdoers.
107. See, e.g., Farris Eng'g Corp. v. Service Bureau Corp., 276 F. Supp. 643, 645
(D.NJ. 1967), aff'd, 406 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1969).
108. U.C.C. § 2-302. See Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp.
39, 45 (D.S.C. 1974); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202, 204, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541,
544 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972). It is extremely unlikely that an exclusion of consequential
liability will be found unconscionable in the context of computer system procurement. See Teamsters Sec. Fund v. Sperry-Rand Corp., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callahan) 951, 970 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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provided by the U.C.C. 10 9 If the limited remedy of repair or replacement fails to alleviate all problems, users may argue that both the
questionable contract provision and the vendor's other clauses limiting its liability for consequential damages should also be stricken.
The recent decision in Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co.,11o however, indicates that the better reasoned approach is to
treat the limitation of consequential damages as separate and independent from the remedy limitation. The court reasoned that although both a consequential damage exclusion and a limitation of
remedy provision are primarily attempts at limiting recovery for
breach of warranty, the U.C.C. tests each by a different standard.
The consequential damage exclusion is valid unless it is unconscionable, and the remedy limitation applies unless it fails of its essential
purpose. 1 Accordingly, the court treated these two issues separately. The plaintiff was awarded damages for breach of warranty
despite the limited warranty but was not awarded consequential
112
damages.
A related question arises when an agreement is embodied in
separate written contracts covering hardware, software, and maintenance. Not all contracts, however, may exclude consequential liability. Often, the courts will resolve any ambiguity against the drafter
of the documents and will not consider the presence of the clause in
some contracts as a bar to awarding consequential damages for
breach of a contract without the clause. 1 3 Conversely, however, a
court may not excuse a user from continuing payments under one
document, (e.g., a maintenance contract) for a vendor's breach of a
114
The
related but separate document (e.g., a software contract).
user in most cases should establish that all documents are "part and
parcel of the entire transaction for the sale of goods," 115 and that the
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
479 F. Supp. 738 (D.NJ. 1979), afJ'd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 744 n.4.
Id. at 744-45.
See, e.g., Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. v. Continental Informa-

tion Sys. Corp., 452 F. Supp. 538, 541 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (damage limitation in maintenance contract did not bar award of consequential damages for breach of separate
hardware sales contract); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325,
333 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (damage limitation in written hardware sales contract did not necessarily exclude consequential liability for breach of separate oral agreement for
programming).

114. Cf. Westfield Chem. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 438, 438 n.1, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1293, 1294 n.1 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977) (user

does not acquire any rights under software contract due to vendor's breach of separate hardware contract).
115. Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 743 (D.NJ.
1979), aff'd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
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vendor's material breach of any provision is a material breach of all
documents. This strategy may increase the vendor's potential liability and aid the user in favorably settling any dispute or litigation.
When an exclusion of consequential liability clause is upheld,
the court must distinguish consequential from other kinds of damages which are not excluded. In Chatlos Systems Inc. v. National
Cash Register Co.,116 consequential damages which were not
awarded included lost profits due to the malfunctioning equipment,
supplies purchased in an attempt to make the equipment function,
executive salaries for the time devoted to the particular malfunction,
and labor costs which would have been saved if the equipment had
worked as warranted. Similarly, in Teamsters Security Fund v.
Sperry Rand Corp.,117 the court held that the "unrealized savings"
to which the user claimed it was entitled due to the vendor's breach
of warranties were consequential damges, for otherwise the vendor
would in effect be an insurer against computer malfunctions.' 1 8
These damages were excluded under a standard limitation of liability provision.
In Applied Data Processing,Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.,119 the issue
of consequential damages was carefully addressed under typical circumstances. The user had been using IBM machines, but upon being convinced that new Burroughs equipment would be so much
more efficient than the comparable IBM machines as to enable the
user to quickly recoup any conversion costs, the user commenced
converting its IBM programs to a format compatible with the Burroughs equipment and ordered the Burroughs equipment for lease.
The equipment never performed as warranted, however, and the
lease was terminated. Liability for breach of contract was not in issue, and the only question before the court was the type of damages
which the user could recover since the contract excluded "indirect
and consequential damages.' 120 The court first divided the damages
into two classes: those occurring prior to the breach and those occurring subsequent to the breach.
The court held that the damages occurring prior to the breach
were clearly not excluded by the clause in question since they were
"not in any sense incurred as a consequence of the breach.' 12 1
These damages included the conversion costs for transforming the
IBM software to a format compatible with the Burroughs equipment
116. Id. at 747.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

6 Computer L Serv. Rep. (Callahan) 961, 968-70 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
Id.
394 F. Supp. 504 (D. Conn. 1975).
Id. at 508 n.5.
Id. at 508.
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(including supplies, staff training, labor costs, and software costs),
the cost of transporting the Burroughs equipment to the user's
electrical rewirpremises, and the cost of site preparation (including
22
ing required for the Burroughs equipment).1
Recovery of the damages occurring subsequent to the breach
was limited to those damages which could be deemed foreseeable.
The court further subdivided these damages into those which ordinarily follow the breach of contracts such as the one entered into,
and those which do not ordinarily so follow but with respect to
which Burroughs had knowledge of special circumstances. The
court held that the exclusion provision prevented recovery of the
latter type. 1' These damages were special or consequential within
the meaning of the exclusion provision.
The foreseeable damages which were found to follow a breach
of contract ordinarily include labor costs for idle-time, for rerunning
improperly processed reports and for dealing with customers because of the malfunction, the costs of removing and returning the
Burroughs equipment, and the costs of purchasing outside computer
time for work which the Burroughs system was unable to perform
due to its malfunction. Damages which were found to be consequential and excluded included the costs of reconverting the Burroughs software to a format compatible with the IBM machines
purchased to replace the malfunctioning Burroughs system, the cost
of converting some of the original IBM software to the new IBM machines, the supplies required for these conversions, and the cost differential between the rental of the new IBM machines and the IBM
machines which would have been rented had the user made a
smooth conversion from its earlier IBM machines to the next level
24
up.1
A user should be able to recover the cost of converting to the
system in question and costs incurred during any period of malfunction but not the cost of converting from the defective system to any
alternate system by relying on Applied Data. As a consequence, a
user should therefore include in any procurement agreement a provision which expressly allows it to recover its conversion and
reprocurement costs in the event the vendor's system proves inadequate. If such a provision is included, a user who must seek a system with larger capacity or at a greater cost from the same or an
alternate vendor will be able to recover, among other damages, the
cost of converting software and other business routines and the cost
122. Id. at 507.
123. Id. at 510.
124. Id.
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of consultants' and attorneys' services in selecting the new system
125
and drafting the new agreements.
The clause excluding consequential damages may exclude other
damages, including indirect, special, incidental and exemplary damgaes, lost profits, and other economic loss.

126

The interplay of all

these terms is not clear. The court in Applied Data Processing,Inc.
v. Burroughs Corp. held that the words "special" and "consequential" were legally identical, and by not granting any separate mean"indirect", treated "indirect" as identical to
ing to the word
",consequential."'127
The word "incidental", on the other hand, has been granted an
entirely different meaning under the U.C.C. "Incidental" is distinguished from "consequential" in the same manner
that general dam128
ages are distinguished from special damages.
"Exemplary" damages are usually considered synonymous with
"punitive" damages. 29 These words describe the type of damages
associated with egregious, intentional tort liability which seldom, if
ever, are awarded for private contract claims. 30 Therefore, the user
should urge the removal of the word "exemplary" from the contract
125. 394 F. Supp. 504 (D. Conn. 1954). Alternatively, the user could attempt to
avoid the effect of this decision by describing its conversion to a new vendor (or to a
more expensive configuration of equipment from the original vendor) as "cover."
Cover is defined as goods purchased "in substitution for those due from the seller."
The buyer may recover the difference between the price for the "cover" and that of
the original contract and, in addition, unless excluded by a specific provision in the
agreement, may recover "incidental damages" such as "commercially reasonable
charges, expenses or commissions in connection with effecting cover" under U.C.C.
§ 2-715(1). In Applied Data Processing, for example, the user could have claimed the
difference between the rental of the new IBM machines and the Burroughs equipment (as opposed to the difference between the rental of the new IBM machines and
the theoretical interim IBM machines), plus incidental damages related to conversion
of software.
126. See, e.g., Convoy Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 601 F.2d 385, 387 (9th Cir. 1979)
("any indirect, special or consequential damages such as loss of anticipated profits or
other economic loss"); Farris Eng'g Corp. v. Service Bureau Corp., 276 F. Supp. 643,
645 (D.NJ. 1967), aff'd, 406 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1969) ("special, consequential, or exemplary damages"); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738,
745 (D.N.J. 1979) aff'd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980) ("special or consequential dam.
ages"); Applied Data Processing v. Burroughs Corp., 394 F. Supp. 504, 508 n.5 (D.
Conn. 1975) ("indirect or consequential damages").
127. Applied Data Processing v. Burroughs Corp., 394 F. Supp. 504, 509 (D. Conn.
1975); see generally 5 A. CoRBIN, CoNTRAcTS § 1011, nn. 12-15 (1964 & Supp. 1971).
128. Compare U.C.C. §§ 2-715(1) and 2-715(2).
129. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 352, 353 (5th ed. 1976).
130. Lovebright Diamond Co. v. Nixdorf Computer Corp., 78 Civ. 4585 (HFW)
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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as being superfluous. 31'
Lost profits are a prime example of consequential damages.
One principal reason for placing the risk of consequential damgaes
upon the user rather than the vendor is the avoidance of liability for
lost profits. Lost profits, however, are also the major component of
damages which a third party may suffer if the vendor's computer
system violates the third party's patent, copyright or other proprietary rights.'3 2 Accordingly, the user should protect itself from such
third party infringement claims by inserting a propriety rights indemnity clause in the contract. Furthermore, this clause must not
be limited by any liability limitation excluding lost profits.
The catch-all clauses, "other economic loss" or "other pecuniary
loss," are meaningless because practically all damages-general or
special, direct or indirect, incidental or consequential--could be
termed pecuniary or economic loss. While such exclusions may be
ignored by a court because they are overboard,133 the user should
not take the risk that a clause excluding such damages will be upheld and interpreted a exclusing any damages. Accordingly, such a
clause should be deleted from the final written contract.
C.

ACCEPTANCE

1. Acceptance Tests
A user following the recommended approach in negotiating will
have created an acceptance test for the system in the contract. Several cases illustrate the pitfalls a user should be careful to avoid.
The acceptance test should not allow a vendor too much
brethering room. In Sha-I Corp. v. City & County of San Francisco,

34

a very simple acceptance test was specified: the system

was to operate for thirty days at a 95 percent effectiveness level. Although the system passed this acceptance test, it subsequently malfunctioned. Since the system met the acceptance test negotiated by
the parties, the court held that the user was obligated to pay for the
system regardless of subsequent failures.
The user should also be careful when relying upon preinstalla131. A user's sole practical remedy in egregious situations may be punitive damages. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 605 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979). Accordingly, although a court

may simply ignore the contract in awarding punitive damages for tort violations, a
user need not take this risk and should insist that the exclusion of exemplary damages be removed as being inappropriate.
132. See text accompanying supra notes 18-25, 50-51.
133. See Convoy Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., No. 74-147 (D. Ore. 1976) (unpubl.),
reported in COMPUTER L. &TAX REP., Aug. 1980, at 2.
134. 612 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980).
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tion demonstrations or experimental periods. If the demonstrations,
experiments or tests prove unsatisfactory, the user should act quickly in writing to avoid losing its rights. In Investors Premium Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp.,13 the buyer attended two demonstrations of operation of the computer and entered into a conditional one-year lease
terminable at will if the computer did not perform to its satisfaction.
Eventually, the buyer converted the lease into a purchases and
purchased a second computer of the same type. The demonstrations and one-year experimental use lease influenced the court to
conclude that the buyer had not relied on the alleged oral warranties made prior to the lease, but had instead bargained for an experimental test period, had been satisfied with the results, and
consequently must be bound by the express terms of the final writ1 36
ten sales agreement.
2.

U.C.C. Provisions

In addition, or as an alternative, to an acceptance test, the user
may rely upon the provisions of the U.C.C. regarding rejection and
revocation of acceptance. The U.C.C. provides that a buyer is entitled to reject for any nonconformity in the goods, 137 and the buyer
need not reject until he has had a reasonable time in which to inspect the goods. 138 Even after acceptance, the buyer has a right to
revoke the acceptance if a latent defect is discovered or if acceptance was conditioned upon cure of any defects by the seller.139 Nevertheless, before relying upon U.C.C. provisions, the user should
carefully review the agreement and consider the surrounding
circumstances.
The buyer's right to reject for any nonconformity is limited by
the seller's right to cure the defect, unless the agreement expressly
makes time of the essence.14° The buyer's right to reject for any
nonconformity is also limited by the vendor's ability to provide a
contractual alternative to cure, such as a repair to replacement remedy. 141 A user should carefully review any form agreement in order
to ascertain whether the agreement eliminates or limits the right to
135. 389 F. Supp. 39, 43-44 (D.S.C. 1974).
136. Id. But compare ARB Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (in
similar circumstances, the user protected its right to withhold payments and to reject
by communicating its reservations about preproduction models).
137. U.C.C. § 2-601.
138. Id. §§ 2-602, 2-606.
139. Id. § 2-608.

140. Id. § 2-508.
141. Id. §§ 2-719, 2-601.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I

reject. 142
The user also should condition its own obligation to pay upon
acceptance. In National Cash Register Co. v. Marshall Savings &
Loan Corp.,143 a form agreement provided that payment would be
due when the system had been delivered, installed, and certified as
being ready for use. Following delivery and installation, the vendor
sent the required certification to the user. Although the user argued
that the system was never ready for use because certain data which
had to be converted were not available upon the date of purported
certification, the court held that the user had effectively accepted
the system upon its certification since the user had not disputed the
certification."'"
The user should diligently exercise its right to reject following a
reasonable time to inspect. For example, in Carl Beasley Ford, Inc.
v. Burroughs Corp.,14 5 an inspection period of "at least eight

months" was held not to be unreasonable as a matter of law given
the complexity of the machine and despite the use of the machine
during the eight-month period of experimentation."'6 The court considered it important that the user had continually written letters in
a timely fashion detailing the various deficiencies in the system and
threatening to reject unless assurances of cure were given and that
Burroughs had continually responded to such warnings with written
reassurances to the user of proper performance. In the last letter,
Burroughs specified a date by which all defects would be corrected,
and the final notice of rejection was written within six weeks of that
147
date.
In contrast, Dumont Handkerchiefs, Inc. v. Nixdorf Computers,
142. Typically, this is accomplished by providing that acceptance shall occur upon
inspection of a test system, shipment of the system, or "when the system has been
delivered, installed and certified by [the Vendor] as being ready for use." National
Cash Register Co. v. Marshall Say. & Loan Ass'n, 415 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1969).
143. Id. at 1132-33.
144. But compare ARB Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (the
user acted to protect its rights and had included a clause in the agreement making
payment dependent upon satisfaction of warranties).
145. 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
146. Id. at 330-31. The facts of this decision may even be more favorable than indi-

cated by the language of the court, for the equipment was actually delivered fourteen
months prior to its rejection, and the written part of the agreement apparently contained clauses that the court ignored which indicated that contractually the user was
given thirty days after initial delivery within which to terminate.
147. Id. at 331. The user was allowed to reject a computer system under the Canadian Sale of Goods Act eleven months after its scheduled installation date and seven
months after its actual installation date where the user "did everything in its power
to assist," had relied on the vendor to cure the problems, and had detailed its request
for a seasonable cure in a letter. Burroughs Bus. Mach. Ltd. v. Feed-Rite Mills (1962)
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Inc. involved an ineffective rejection."4 Despite an option to cancel
in the contract and the failure of the vendor to complete certain contractual obligations, the court held that because Dumont continued
to enjoy its beneficial use for many months after its initial opportunity to cancel under the purchase agreement, the user did not effectively reject the computer.
Accordingly, in order to preserve the right to reject, a user
should give prompt written notice to the vendor of any defects in
the systems, identify the defects, 149 and request assurance of correction by the vendor. 150
In utilizing a system with defects while awaiting correction by
the vendor, the user runs the risk that it will be deemed to have accepted the system by virtue of acts "inconsistent with the seller's
ownership." 151 Even if the user preserves its right to revoke acceptance by informing the vendor of the defects and requesting assurance of cure, 152 the user runs another risk by continuing to use the
system and attempting to remedy any problems with it. The vendor
may argue that the user has caused a "substantial change in condition" of the system such that the right to revoke acceptance is
lost.' 53 In ARB Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc.,154 however, the court refused
to place a user in a dilemma where the user "engaged at its peril" in
the process of using a "complex piece of machinery" while attempting with the vendor "to work the bug out.' 5 5 Accordingly, the court
held that "'changes' occurring in the process of a good faith attempt
to make the equipment work are not 'substantial changes in condition' within the meaning of section 2-608(2).9156
The right to revoke acceptance, like the right to reject, may also
be subject to contractual limitations, although the U.C.C. makes no
mention of this possibility. Arguably, if a vendor form contract limits the right to reject to a mere right to require replacement or repair which may prove inadequate, 15 7 the user should retain the right
Ltd., 42 D.L.R.3d 303, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1050, 1052-3 (Q.B. Manch.
1973).
148. 63 A.D.2d 618, 405 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1978).
149. See U.C.C. § 2-605.
150. See U.C.C. § 2-609. See also ARB Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (discussing the relation of section 2-609 to the right to reject or revoke
acceptance).
151. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(c).
152. See ARB, Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
153. U.C.C. § 2-608(2).
154. 663 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Consequently, it "fails of its essential purpose" pursuant to U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
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to revoke acceptance. If the right to revoke is not retained, users
will be left without any remedy, thereby invalidating the limitation
of remedy provision under Section 2-719(2). For example, in National Cash Register Co. v. Adell Industries, Inc.,158 the court refused to allow a repair or replacement limitation remedy to preclude
revocation based upon breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. This limitation clause was unenforceable because it would cause the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose to fail in its essential purpose.
The user may find the U.C.C. rejection or revocation provisions
unavailable or useless because of the context in which the transaction is arranged. For example, if performance is not specified as a
precondition for payment, an allegation that the system is not performing as desired or expected may not be a defense against an action for replevin by the seller on grounds of nonpayment. 159 In
addition, if the user acquired the computer system through a lease
from a third party financing agent who purchased the system from
the manufacturer and subsequently leased it to the user, the almost
guaranteed presence of a "hell or high water" clause in the third
party lease agreement (specifying that payments due under the
lease will not be subject to withholding or offset as a result of any
160
claims) removes one of the user's defenses to a replevin action.
Such a clause may also terminate any right the user may have had
against the third party to reject or revoke acceptance since the third
161
party has a mere security interest.
The third party lease arrangement may also eliminate the user's
rights against the manufacturer. In Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National
Cash Register Corp.,162 the court held that although the U.C.C. applied to the contract between the manufacturer and the lessee, the
'lessee was unable to invoke the revocation of acceptance provisions
and was not entitled to certain damage remedies provided in the
U.C.C. because of the presence of the third party owner of the
equipment.
158. 57 Mich. App. 413, 225 N.W.2d 785 (1975).
159. See F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 988
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Honeywell Information Sys., Inc. v. Demographic Sys., Inc., 396 F.
Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Computer Leasing Co. v. Computing & Software, Inc., 37
Ohio Misc. 19, 306 N.E.2d 191 (1973).
160. See Citicorp Leasing, Inc. v. Allied Institutional Distrib., Inc., 454 F. Supp. 511
(W.D. Okla. 1977) (lease held to be a security agreement); National Bank of North
Am. v. Deluxe Poster Co., 51 A.D.2d 582, 378 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1976) ("hell or high water
clause" upheld despite defenses the lessee would otherwise have had against the
manufacturer).
161. See supra note 160.
162. 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979).
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The presence of a third party financing agent or lessor, however,
may not eliminate the user's right to claim damages for breach of
warranty against the manufacturer. 1 63 Nevertheless, the lessee
should specify in the third party lease that the warranties and indemnities of the manufacturer are to be assigned to the lessee, to
the extent that the lessor has the power to do so. Furthermore, an
acceptance test should be created which makes the obligation to pay
rent contingent upon successful completion of acceptance testing
procedures. Creative ways to avoid the full effect of the hell or high
water clause on the lessee's ability to withhold or offset payments
with respect to malfunctioning computer systems should also be
considered.
The most troublesome legal problem with respect to the delivery and acceptance of computer systems arises in the context of a
vendor's promise to deliver new technology which does not achieve
its stated objectives. In United States v. Wegematic Corp.,164 a
machine which was represented to be "a truly revolutionary system
utilizing all the latest technical advances"'1 65 was not completed on
time and was never delivered. The manufacturer requested cancellation of the contract without damages, but the government exercised its right to acquire alternate equipment and pressed its claims
for liquidated damages, for the increased cost of the alternate equipment, and for certain costs incurred prior to the breach. The court
rejected the manufacturer's defense of practical impossibility, which
was interpreted by the court to be equivalent to the "excuse by failure of presupposed conditions" provision of the U.C.C.' 66 The court
said, "we see no basis for thinking that when an electronic system is
the
promoted by its manufacturer as a revolutionary breakthrough,
167
risk of the revolution's occurrence falls on the purchaser."'
The impact of this case is limited in several respects. First, as
the court noted, "if a manufacturer wishes to be relieved of the risk
that what looks good on paper may not prove so good in hardware,
the appropriate exculpatory language is well known and often
used."'1
Vendor form contracts generally contain such language,
including disclaimers of any implied warranties and a limited express warranty may achieve the same purpose 169 and force majeure
163. See, e.g., Atlas Indus., Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 216 Kan. 213, 531 P.2d
41(1975).
164. 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
165. Id. at 675.

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 675-76; U.C.C. § 2-615.
360 F.2d at 676.
Id. at 677.
See text accompanying supra note 73.
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or "acts of God" clauses, excusing the vendor for the occurrence of
events beyond the reasonable control of the vendor. In a functioning system is produced and installed, the user may not be able to
prove that the system was represented to be state of the art but
failed to achieve that standard. 170 Second, although a manufacturer
may be liable for fraud or misrepresentation because it failed to reveal developmental difficulties in creating the new technology, 171 evidence of the failure of prior test on the prototype may be
inadmissiblel 72 unless the prototype was almost identical to the system actually delivered.
IV. CONCLUSION
The user who follows the negotiation strategy outlined in this
article will be able to protect himself from many of the potential
risks involved in procurement of a major computer system. In addition, the basic legal issues involved in a procurement can be effectively addressed during negotiations. The treatment of computer
contracts by the courts is still unclear. Nevertheless, obtaining the
proper contract clauses can make a procurement a successful and
profitable venture.

170. Cf. Sperry-Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964).
171. Strand v. Librascope, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
172. Renfro Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 552 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir.
1977).

